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Abstract
Deep neural networks have recently achieved tremen-
dous success in image classification. Recent studies have
however shown that they are easily misled into incorrect
classification decisions by adversarial examples. Adver-
saries can even craft attacks by querying the model in black-
box settings, where no information about the model is re-
leased except its final decision. Such decision-based at-
tacks usually require lots of queries, while real-world image
recognition systems might actually restrict the number of
queries. In this paper, we propose qFool, a novel decision-
based attack algorithm that can generate adversarial exam-
ples using a small number of queries. The qFool method can
drastically reduce the number of queries compared to pre-
vious decision-based attacks while reaching the same qual-
ity of adversarial examples. We also enhance our method
by constraining adversarial perturbations in low-frequency
subspace, which can make qFool even more computation-
ally efficient. Altogether, we manage to fool commercial
image recognition systems with a small number of queries,
which demonstrates the actual effectiveness of our new al-
gorithm in practice.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks have led to major breakthroughs
in recent years and have been developing as powerful tools
in various applications, including computer vision [15, 14],
speech [19, 11], health-care [13, 17], etc. Despite their huge
success, it has been shown that these networks are vulnera-
ble to deliberate attacks. An adversary can generate adver-
sarial examples [26] that look very similar to the original
∗Work done during a summer internship at EPFL-LTS4.
images, yet that can mislead a deep neural network to give
an incorrect output.
Many existing attacks focus on white-box settings [8, 4],
where adversaries have full access to all information of the
model. They can attack models by computing gradients
of the loss function. White-box attacks are interesting to
derive a better understanding of deep neural networks, but
they are unrealistic in a more practical setting, where adver-
saries have no knowledge about model parameters. In this
case, called the black-box setting, some recent works focus
on the score-based attacks [21, 5], where they make a large
number of queries to the target model and exploit the output
probabilities to generate adversarial examples. Most exist-
ing black-box attacks do however not consider that queries
are usually costly in terms of both time and money, espe-
cially for commercial models. And, in fact, some commer-
cial models only provide users with the final decision (top-
1 label), and not even any output probabilities. This sce-
nario corresponds to decision-based settings, where attacks
[3] are actually the most challenging for adversaries.
In this paper, we propose a novel method of decision-
based attack called qFool that computes adversarial exam-
ples with only a few queries. We consider both non-targeted
and targeted attacks, where we advantageously exploit the
fact that the decision boundary is locally flat around adver-
sarial examples. In non-targeted attacks, we estimate the
gradient direction of the decision boundary only by rely-
ing on the top-1 label of each query result. We then search
for an adversarial example directly from the original im-
age in the estimated direction. In targeted attacks, we make
iterative gradient estimations on multiple points along the
boundary and seek for adversarial examples with the help
of a target image. Both our non-targeted and targeted at-
tacks can mislead networks with only few queries. More-
over, our experiments show that searching perturbations in
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a low-dimensional subspace is even more efficient in query-
limited settings. We thus propose to extend qFool to sub-
spaces in order to further reduce the number of queries.
Finally, we use qFool to fool a famous commercial image
recognition service with only a small number of queries to
the model.
Our main contributions are the following:
• We propose a novel method, qFool, for generating ad-
versarial examples when only having access to the top-
1 label decision of a trained deep network model.
• We demonstrate that qFool needs fewer queries than
previous decision-based attacks in both non-targeted
and targeted settings.
• We enhance the proposed qFool with properly chosen
subspace constraints, thus further reducing the number
of queries while maintaining a high fooling rate.
• We apply qFool to Google Cloud Vision, an example
of commercially deployed black-box machine learning
system. We demonstrate that such commercial classi-
fiers can be fooled with a small number of queries.
2. Related Work
Szegedy et al. [26] were the first to show the vulnera-
bility of deep networks to adversarial examples. Depending
on how much adversaries know about networks, adversarial
attacks are divided into white-box and black-box attacks.
In white-box setting, adversaries have all the knowledge
about the network itself. It is a more favorable situation for
adversaries to attack.
Gradient-based attacks. Most white-box attacks need the
gradient of loss function of the network. Goodfellow et al.
[8] proposed a fast gradient sign method (FGSM), which
explores the gradient direction. The Jacobian saliency map
attack (JSMA) by Papernot et al. [25] uses the saliency
map to compute the adversarial perturbation. DeepFool
by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [20] generates an adversarial
example by exploring the nearest decision boundary and
crossing it to deceive the network. C&W attack by Carlini
and Wanger [4] solves a more efficient optimization prob-
lem under three distance measurements with the Adam op-
timizer. Houdini by Cisse [6] is an approach for generating
adversarial examples specifically tailored for task losses,
and it can be applied to a range of applications. Baluja and
Fischer [1] trained Adversarial Transformation Networks to
generate adversarial examples with a very large diversity
against a target network or set of networks.
All these white-box attacks need to compute gradients
of models, but sometimes attackers might have no access to
the model or it may contain non-differentiable operations.
So black-box attacks have gained more attention recently.
In the black-box attacks, adversaries do not have knowl-
edge of the network. They only have access to the predic-
tions by querying it. Black-box attacks can roughly be di-
vided into three families: transfer-based, score-based and
decision-based attacks.
Transfer-based attacks. Szegedy et al. [26] found that
adversarial examples can transfer between models, thus en-
abling black-box attacks on deployed models. Transfer-
based attacks aim to train a surrogate model by exploiting
predictions from an underlying target model. Papernot et al.
[22] showed that adversarial examples crafted based on sur-
rogate models can mislead the target model. Liu et al. [18]
developed an ensemble transfer-based attack and showed its
high success against Clarifai.com, a commercial image clas-
sification service.
Score-based attacks. Adversaries only rely on the pre-
dicted scores of a model to generate adversarial examples
in score-based attacks. Narodytska et al. [21] proposed the
local-search attack that measures a models sensitivity to in-
dividual pixels. Chen et al. [5] proposed Zeroth Order Op-
timization (ZOO), that approximates gradient information
by the symmetric difference quotient to generate adversar-
ial examples. Hayes et al. [9] used the predicted scores to
train an attacker model for black-box attacks.
Decision-based attacks. Decision-based attacks rely only
on the class decision (top-1 label) of the model. A simple
method is the additive Gaussian noise attack [23], which
probes the robustness of a model to i.i.d. normal noises. Ad-
versaries can also use uniform noise, salt and pepper noise,
contrast reduction or Gaussian blur. But perturbations com-
puted by these simple methods are usually very perceptible.
Brendel et al. [3] proposed the Boundary attack, that can
generate much smaller adversarial perturbations effectively.
It starts from a large adversarial perturbation and iteratively
reduces the norm of the perturbation by making the per-
turbed data point walk along the decision boundary while
ensuring that it stays in the adversarial region.
Most black-box attacks usually require a large number
of queries to the network model, while this is an impor-
tant constraint in practice. Li et al. [16] introduced an
active learning strategy to significantly reduce the num-
ber of queries for transfer-based attacks. For score-based
attacks, Ilyas et al. [12] applied natural evolution strate-
gies and only used two to three orders of magnitude fewer
queries than previous methods. Bhagoji et al. [2] proposed
random feature grouping and principal component analy-
sis, which can achieve both high query efficiency and high
success rate. Finally in decision-based attacks, since ad-
versaries get less information from each query, the required
number of queries is definitely large. Reducing the number
of queries in decision-based is definitely challenging and
in line with practical settings. In this paper, we propose
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a novel decision-based attack, which greatly improves the
query efficiency even with commercial black-box systems.
3. Non-targeted decision-based attacks
We describe now our new decision-based attack algo-
rithm. We consider a trained model with parameters θ that
can be represented as fθ : x→ y, where x ∈ Rd is an input
normalized image and y is the final decision of the model,
i.e., the top-1 classification label.
We first consider the non-targeted attack problem, where
an adversary computes an adversarial perturbation v to
change the estimated label of an image x0, i.e., fθ(x0 +
v) 6= fθ(x0). Furthermore, there shall be no perceptible
difference between the perturbed and original image, i.e.,
the Euclidean norm ||v||2 ≤ τ for some small τ . The adver-
sarial example is constructed by making queries to the un-
known deep network. Theoretically, the more queries, the
more information that one can get about the target model,
and the smaller the adversarial perturbation. We aim to use
as few queries as possible such that the norm of the pertur-
bation is smaller than a certain threshold τ .
3.1. Query-efficient design
The basic idea of our decision-based attack algorithm is
the following. Fawzi et al. [7] have shown that the deci-
sion boundary has a quite small curvature in the vicinity of
adversarial examples. This indicates that some geometry
properties of the decision boundary can be approximated in
a similar way at different neighbour points around adver-
sarial examples. We therefore exploit this observation to
compute the adversarial perturbation v. The direction of
the minimal adversarial perturbation v for the input sam-
ple x0 is theoretically the gradient direction of the decision
boundary at xadv . As we do not have full access to the clas-
sifier’s structure in the black-box scenario, it is impossible
to compute the direction directly. But, since the boundary
is quite flat, the gradient of the classifier at point xadv is
almost the same as the gradient at other neighboring points
on the boundary. Hence, the direction of v can be approxi-
mated well by ξ, the gradient estimated at neighbour point
P . Then we can seek for an adversarial xadv from x0 along
the approximated direction ξ. The basic logic is illustrated
in Fig. 1. More details about each step are given below.
(1) Initial point. First, we find a small random noise r to
perturb the original image x0 and identify a starting point
P on the boundary. Formally,
P := x0 +min
r
||r||2 s.t. fθ(P) 6= fθ(x0), r ∼ N (0, σ)
(1)
To do that, we add some random Gaussian noises ri ∼
N (0, σi)(i = 1, 2, ..., k) to the original image and make
queries to the system, until the image P = x0 + rj is mis-
classified. In order to make the starting point closer to the
η1, ...,ηn
r
P
xadv
x0
B
ξ
(1)
(2)
(3) v
Figure 1: A simple illustration of three steps to compute an
adversarial example by qFool. (1) Compute starting pointP
with a random perturbation r. (2) Estimate gradient direc-
tion ξ at P by n perturbation vectors η1, ...,ηn. (3) Search
an adversarial example xadv with a perturbation v in the
estimated gradient direction ξ.
decision boundary, we then do a binary search, in the direc-
tion of rj to find a small Gaussian noise r that makes the
perturbed image located on the boundary.
(2) Gradient estimation. The gradient of boundary∇f(P)
is estimated using only the top-1 label of the classifier. We
randomly generate n small vectors η1, ...,ηn with the same
norm to perturb P and query the classifier to get the pre-
dicted label f(P + ηi). We define:
zi =
{
−1 f(P + ηi) = f(x0)
+1 f(P + ηi) 6= f(x0)
, i = 1, 2, ..., n (2)
Theoretically, the vectors (η1, ...,ηn) are likely to be
symmetrically distributed on both sides of the decision
boundary. For large enough n, 1n
∑n
i=1 ziηi converges to
the normal of the decision boundary as the components of
ηi’s along the decision boundary will cancel out each other.
Hence, the direction of the gradient ∇f(P) can be esti-
mated as
ξ =
∑n
i=1 ziηi
||∑ni=1 ziηi||2 . (3)
(3) Directional search. Due to the flatness of the boundary,
the direction of the gradient at point xadv can be approxi-
mated by the one at point P , i.e., ∇f(P) ≈ ξ, which can
be computed by Eq. (3). We can thus find the adversarial
example xadv by perturbing the original image x0 in the
direction of ξ until we hit the decision boundary. It only
costs a few queries to the classifier by using a binary search
algorithm.
The qFool design described above is highly paralleliz-
able, which can bring important speed-ups. In the step of
gradient estimation, where the vast majority of queries are
consumed, we can conduct parallel queries, as they are in-
dependent of each other. On the contrary, in all previous
decision-based attacks, the algorithms are usually executed
in an iterative way, and the results are highly dependent on
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the ones of the previous iterations. Hence, our algorithm
can not only reduce the number of queries, but also save
considerable computation time due to parallelization.
3.2. qFool algorithm
Algorithm 1: Non-targeted qFool
Input: original image x0, initial estimation number
nu, a threshold .
1 i = 0 ;
2 Search starting point P0 ;
3 while
∑i
j=0 n
(j) < n do
4 n(i) = 0 ;
5 x
(i)
adv = x
′
adv = Pi ;
6 while
∥∥∥x(i)adv−Pi∥∥∥
n(i)+nu
≤  · ‖x
′
adv−Pi‖
n(i)
and∑i
j=0 n
(j) < n do
7 Make nu new queries ;
8 x′adv = x
(i)
adv ;
9 n(i) = n(i) + nu ;
10 Estimate gradient ξi at Pi with n(i) queries
in full/sub space;
11 Binary search for x(i)adv = x0 + β · ξi ;
12 end
13 Pi+1 = x(i)adv , i = i+ 1 ;
14 end
15 return x(i−1)adv
The distance between the starting point P and original
point x0 directly impacts the quality of adversarial pertur-
bations computed in Section 3.1. If we find a better starting
point P that is closer to the boundary, the final perturbation
is generally smaller and more likely to be imperceptible.
Therefore, we design the qFool attack as an iterative al-
gorithm where the starting point P is iteratively updated.
The total number of queries n is divided into s iterations,
i.e., n = n(0) + n(1) + ... + n(s−1). s and n(i) (i =
0, ..., s − 1) can be found adaptively. At i-th iteration, we
query the model n(i) times. These queries permit to esti-
mate the gradient direction ξi at starting point Pi, and to
search for the adversarial example x(i)adv in the direction of
ξi. Then we update the starting point Pi+1 to x(i)adv in the
next iteration.
The allocation of the number of queries n = n(0) +
n(1) + ... + n(s−1) in the gradient estimation plays an im-
portant role in the efficiency of the algorithm. Here we find
n(i) (i = 0, 1, ...s − 1) in a heuristic and greedy way. In
one iteration, we first initialize the number of queries with
a small nu and compute an adversarial perturbation follow-
ing the three steps described in Section 3.1. Then we grad-
ually increase the number of queries in this iteration to get a
smaller perturbation. This process will stop when the reduc-
tion rate of the perturbation is less than a preset threshold or
the number of used queries reaches n. With this method, we
can find an appropriate number of queries for each iteration
n(i)(i = 0, 1, ..., s− 1).
The norm of noise vectors in the step of estimating gra-
dient direction is another important parameter. It should be
small enough so that the boundary between the adversarial
and non-adversarial regions can be considered as approxi-
mately linear. If so, we expect to get an equal split of +1
and −1 for zi in Eq. (2). We dynamically adjust the norm
ω(k) in the k-th iteration according to the norm and the per-
centage of zi = +1 in previous iterations. We formalize
this adjustment in Eq. (4).
ω(k+1) = ω(k) · (1 + φ(k) · ρ(k))
φ(k) = −sign(ρ(k)) · φ(k−1)
(4)
where ω(0) = ω0, φ(0) = −1. φ(k) controls the increase or
decrease of ω(k), and ρ(k) is the difference between 0.5 and
the proportion of zi that are equal to +1. In this way, we can
always ensure that the noise vectors are evenly distributed
on both sides of the boundary.
3.3. qFool in subspace
In order to further reduce the number of queries, we now
propose to concentrate on perturbations that belong to a
properly chosen subspace, in order to simplify the search
for adversarial perturbations. Indeed, it has been shown
that adversarial perturbations that cause data misclassifica-
tion can be found within specific subspaces [7]. Hence, in
the step of gradient estimation, instead of using n noise vec-
tors η1, ...,ηn of dimension d, we randomly choose n noise
vectors in a pre-defined subspace of dimension m  d.
The other steps of the algorithm remain the same. The non-
targeted qFool algorithm is described in Alg. 1.
Generating adversarial perturbations in subspaces rather
than full data space clearly reduces the complexity of query-
ing the model. The more symmetrically the sampled noise
vectors are distributed, the better the components in the
other directions than the gradient direction will cancel out,
so the more accurate the estimated gradient direction. Given
a limited number of sampled noise vectors, these vectors are
distributed more sparsely in the full space than in a lower
dimensional subspace. Thus, the probability that these vec-
tors are symmetrically distributed on both sides of gradi-
ent direction in a subspace is larger than the one in the full
space. This leads to a smaller adversarial perturbation in a
subspace. Alternatively, given a threshold of the norm of
perturbation, the subspace method requires fewer queries.
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<latexit sha1_base64="8E7x avK8zeB29DVMK2EOOiwdWrs=">AAAB+HicbVC7TsMwFL3hWcqjAS QWFosKialKWGCsYGFsJfqQ2ig4rtNadZzIdhAlypewMIAQK5/Cxs K34LQdoOVIlo7OuVf3+AQJZ0o7zpe1srq2vrFZ2ipv7+zuVez9g7 aKU0loi8Q8lt0AK8qZoC3NNKfdRFIcBZx2gvF14XfuqVQsFrd6k lAvwkPBQkawNpJvV/oR1qMgzB5yP9N52berTs2ZAi0Td06q9aPm9 x0ANHz7sz+ISRpRoQnHSvVcJ9FehqVmhNO83E8VTTAZ4yHtGSpwR JWXTYPn6NQoAxTG0jyh0VT9vZHhSKlJFJjJIqZa9ArxP6+X6vDS y5hIUk0FmR0KU450jIoW0IBJSjSfGIKJZCYrIiMsMdGmq6IEd/HL y6R9XnOdmts0bVzBDCU4hhM4AxcuoA430IAWEEjhCV7g1Xq0nq03 6302umLNdw7hD6yPH5vPlTU=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="6HV1 0xG/T1vo8uKzppW/8r5P5aw=">AAAB+HicbVC7TsMwFL3hWcqjAS QWFosKialKWGCsysLYSvQhtVHluE5r1XEi20GUKF/CwgBCDCx8A1 /AxsK34LQdoOVIlo7OuVf3+PgxZ0o7zpe1srq2vrFZ2Cpu7+zule z9g5aKEklok0Q8kh0fK8qZoE3NNKedWFIc+py2/fFV7rdvqVQsE jd6ElMvxEPBAkawNlLfLvVCrEd+kN5l/VRnxb5ddirOFGiZuHNSr h41vtlb7aPetz97g4gkIRWacKxU13Vi7aVYakY4zYq9RNEYkzEe0 q6hAodUeek0eIZOjTJAQSTNExpN1d8bKQ6VmoS+mcxjqkUvF//z uokOLr2UiTjRVJDZoSDhSEcobwENmKRE84khmEhmsiIywhITbbrK S3AXv7xMWucV16m4DdNGDWYowDGcwBm4cAFVuIY6NIFAAg/wBM/W vfVovVivs9EVa75zCH9gvf8A7RCW8Q==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="6HV1 0xG/T1vo8uKzppW/8r5P5aw=">AAAB+HicbVC7TsMwFL3hWcqjAS QWFosKialKWGCsysLYSvQhtVHluE5r1XEi20GUKF/CwgBCDCx8A1 /AxsK34LQdoOVIlo7OuVf3+PgxZ0o7zpe1srq2vrFZ2Cpu7+zule z9g5aKEklok0Q8kh0fK8qZoE3NNKedWFIc+py2/fFV7rdvqVQsE jd6ElMvxEPBAkawNlLfLvVCrEd+kN5l/VRnxb5ddirOFGiZuHNSr h41vtlb7aPetz97g4gkIRWacKxU13Vi7aVYakY4zYq9RNEYkzEe0 q6hAodUeek0eIZOjTJAQSTNExpN1d8bKQ6VmoS+mcxjqkUvF//z uokOLr2UiTjRVJDZoSDhSEcobwENmKRE84khmEhmsiIywhITbbrK S3AXv7xMWucV16m4DdNGDWYowDGcwBm4cAFVuIY6NIFAAg/wBM/W vfVovVivs9EVa75zCH9gvf8A7RCW8Q==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="EA/B /WUEduDXm1leOs888zwedWM=">AAAB+HicbVDLSsNAFL3xWeujUZ duBovgqiRudFl047KCfUAbwmQ6aYdOHszciDX0S9y4UMStn+LOv3 HSZqGtBwYO59zLPXOCVAqNjvNtra1vbG5tV3aqu3v7BzX78Kijk0 wx3maJTFQvoJpLEfM2CpS8lypOo0DybjC5KfzuA1daJPE9TlPuR XQUi1Awikby7dogojgOwvxx5uc4q/p23Wk4c5BV4pakDiVavv01G CYsi3iMTFKt+66TopdThYJJPqsOMs1TyiZ0xPuGxjTi2svnwWfkz ChDEibKvBjJXP29kdNI62kUmMkipl72CvE/r59heOXlIk4z5DFb HAozSTAhRQtkKBRnKKeGUKaEyUrYmCrK0HRVlOAuf3mVdC4artNw 75x687qsowIncArn4MIlNOEWWtAGBhk8wyu8WU/Wi/VufSxG16xy 5xj+wPr8AQ03k1A=</latexit>
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<latexit sha1_base64="ycUpIEq Zpv8a/QlQ+7+hy67vBVo=">AAAB9HicbVDLSsNAFL3xWeur6tLNYBFclU QEXRbduKxgH9CGMplO2qGTSZy5KZTQ73DjQhG3fow7/8ZJm4W2Hhg4nHM v98wJEikMuu63s7a+sbm1Xdop7+7tHxxWjo5bJk41400Wy1h3Amq4FIo3 UaDknURzGgWSt4PxXe63J1wbEatHnCbcj+hQiVAwilbyexHFEaMya8z6b r9SdWvuHGSVeAWpQoFGv/LVG8QsjbhCJqkxXc9N0M+oRsEkn5V7qeEJZW M65F1LFY248bN56Bk5t8qAhLG2TyGZq783MhoZM40CO5mHNMteLv7ndVM Mb/xMqCRFrtjiUJhKgjHJGyADoTlDObWEMi1sVsJGVFOGtqeyLcFb/vIq aV3WPLfmPVxV67dFHSU4hTO4AA+uoQ730IAmMHiCZ3iFN2fivDjvzsdi dM0pdk7gD5zPH7Mxkgk=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="ycUpIEq Zpv8a/QlQ+7+hy67vBVo=">AAAB9HicbVDLSsNAFL3xWeur6tLNYBFclU QEXRbduKxgH9CGMplO2qGTSZy5KZTQ73DjQhG3fow7/8ZJm4W2Hhg4nHM v98wJEikMuu63s7a+sbm1Xdop7+7tHxxWjo5bJk41400Wy1h3Amq4FIo3 UaDknURzGgWSt4PxXe63J1wbEatHnCbcj+hQiVAwilbyexHFEaMya8z6b r9SdWvuHGSVeAWpQoFGv/LVG8QsjbhCJqkxXc9N0M+oRsEkn5V7qeEJZW M65F1LFY248bN56Bk5t8qAhLG2TyGZq783MhoZM40CO5mHNMteLv7ndVM Mb/xMqCRFrtjiUJhKgjHJGyADoTlDObWEMi1sVsJGVFOGtqeyLcFb/vIq aV3WPLfmPVxV67dFHSU4hTO4AA+uoQ730IAmMHiCZ3iFN2fivDjvzsdi dM0pdk7gD5zPH7Mxkgk=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="ycUpIEq Zpv8a/QlQ+7+hy67vBVo=">AAAB9HicbVDLSsNAFL3xWeur6tLNYBFclU QEXRbduKxgH9CGMplO2qGTSZy5KZTQ73DjQhG3fow7/8ZJm4W2Hhg4nHM v98wJEikMuu63s7a+sbm1Xdop7+7tHxxWjo5bJk41400Wy1h3Amq4FIo3 UaDknURzGgWSt4PxXe63J1wbEatHnCbcj+hQiVAwilbyexHFEaMya8z6b r9SdWvuHGSVeAWpQoFGv/LVG8QsjbhCJqkxXc9N0M+oRsEkn5V7qeEJZW M65F1LFY248bN56Bk5t8qAhLG2TyGZq783MhoZM40CO5mHNMteLv7ndVM Mb/xMqCRFrtjiUJhKgjHJGyADoTlDObWEMi1sVsJGVFOGtqeyLcFb/vIq aV3WPLfmPVxV67dFHSU4hTO4AA+uoQ730IAmMHiCZ3iFN2fivDjvzsdi dM0pdk7gD5zPH7Mxkgk=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="ycUpIEq Zpv8a/QlQ+7+hy67vBVo=">AAAB9HicbVDLSsNAFL3xWeur6tLNYBFclU QEXRbduKxgH9CGMplO2qGTSZy5KZTQ73DjQhG3fow7/8ZJm4W2Hhg4nHM v98wJEikMuu63s7a+sbm1Xdop7+7tHxxWjo5bJk41400Wy1h3Amq4FIo3 UaDknURzGgWSt4PxXe63J1wbEatHnCbcj+hQiVAwilbyexHFEaMya8z6b r9SdWvuHGSVeAWpQoFGv/LVG8QsjbhCJqkxXc9N0M+oRsEkn5V7qeEJZW M65F1LFY248bN56Bk5t8qAhLG2TyGZq783MhoZM40CO5mHNMteLv7ndVM Mb/xMqCRFrtjiUJhKgjHJGyADoTlDObWEMi1sVsJGVFOGtqeyLcFb/vIq aV3WPLfmPVxV67dFHSU4hTO4AA+uoQ730IAmMHiCZ3iFN2fivDjvzsdi dM0pdk7gD5zPH7Mxkgk=</latexit> P1
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<latexit sha1_base64="LXSFvJCZYQiB4BeLooZMI+EF1Jc=">AAAB6ni cbVDLSgNBEOyNrxhfUY96GAyCp7Cbix6DXjwmaB6QLGF2MpsMmZ1dZnqFsOQTvHhQxKsf4Xd48+anOHkcNLGgoajqprsrSKQw6LpfTm5tfWNzK79d2Nn d2z8oHh41TZxqxhsslrFuB9RwKRRvoEDJ24nmNAokbwWjm6nfeuDaiFjd4zjhfkQHSoSCUbTSXb1X6RVLbtmdgawSb0FK1dOP+jcA1HrFz24/ZmnEFTJ Jjel4boJ+RjUKJvmk0E0NTygb0QHvWKpoxI2fzU6dkHOr9EkYa1sKyUz9PZHRyJhxFNjOiOLQLHtT8T+vk2J45WdCJSlyxeaLwlQSjMn0b9IXmjOUY0so 08LeStiQasrQplOwIXjLL6+SZqXsuWWvbtO4hjnycAJncAEeXEIVbqEGDWAwgEd4hhdHOk/Oq/M2b805i5lj+APn/QfgdY+7</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="QVM5tsE9Fz8XhzN0oqB6wneaMZw=">AAAB6ni cbVDLSgNBEOz1GeMr6lGRwSB4Cru56DHoxWOC5gHJEmYnnWTI7OwyMyuEJUePXjwo4tWPyHd48xv8CSePgyYWNBRV3XR3BbHg2rjul7Oyura+sZnZym7 v7O7t5w4OazpKFMMqi0SkGgHVKLjEquFGYCNWSMNAYD0Y3Ez8+gMqzSN5b4Yx+iHtSd7ljBor3VXaxXYu7xbcKcgy8eYkXzoZV74fT8fldu6z1YlYEqI 0TFCtm54bGz+lynAmcJRtJRpjyga0h01LJQ1R++n01BE5t0qHdCNlSxoyVX9PpDTUehgGtjOkpq8XvYn4n9dMTPfKT7mME4OSzRZ1E0FMRCZ/kw5XyIwY WkKZ4vZWwvpUUWZsOlkbgrf48jKpFQueW/AqNo1rmCEDx3AGF+DBJZTgFspQBQY9eIIXeHWE8+y8Oe+z1hVnPnMEf+B8/AC+upEh</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="QVM5tsE9Fz8XhzN0oqB6wneaMZw=">AAAB6ni cbVDLSgNBEOz1GeMr6lGRwSB4Cru56DHoxWOC5gHJEmYnnWTI7OwyMyuEJUePXjwo4tWPyHd48xv8CSePgyYWNBRV3XR3BbHg2rjul7Oyura+sZnZym7 v7O7t5w4OazpKFMMqi0SkGgHVKLjEquFGYCNWSMNAYD0Y3Ez8+gMqzSN5b4Yx+iHtSd7ljBor3VXaxXYu7xbcKcgy8eYkXzoZV74fT8fldu6z1YlYEqI 0TFCtm54bGz+lynAmcJRtJRpjyga0h01LJQ1R++n01BE5t0qHdCNlSxoyVX9PpDTUehgGtjOkpq8XvYn4n9dMTPfKT7mME4OSzRZ1E0FMRCZ/kw5XyIwY WkKZ4vZWwvpUUWZsOlkbgrf48jKpFQueW/AqNo1rmCEDx3AGF+DBJZTgFspQBQY9eIIXeHWE8+y8Oe+z1hVnPnMEf+B8/AC+upEh</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="0hUHJ87PhF7N6u4BCbiNIDvCPAg=">AAAB6ni cbVA9TwJBEJ3DL8Qv1NJmIzGxInc0UhJtLCHKRwIXsrfMwYa9vcvungm58BNsLDTG1l9k579xgSsUfMkkL+/NZGZekAiujet+O4Wt7Z3dveJ+6eDw6Pi kfHrW0XGqGLZZLGLVC6hGwSW2DTcCe4lCGgUCu8H0buF3n1BpHstHM0vQj+hY8pAzaqz00BrWhuWKW3WXIJvEy0kFcjSH5a/BKGZphNIwQbXue25i/Iw qw5nAeWmQakwom9Ix9i2VNELtZ8tT5+TKKiMSxsqWNGSp/p7IaKT1LApsZ0TNRK97C/E/r5+asO5nXCapQclWi8JUEBOTxd9kxBUyI2aWUKa4vZWwCVWU GZtOyYbgrb+8STq1qudWvZZbadzmcRThAi7hGjy4gQbcQxPawGAMz/AKb45wXpx352PVWnDymXP4A+fzB9B7jXY=</latexit>
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Figure 2: An illustration of qFool in targeted attacks.
4. Targeted attacks
We now extend our method to the targeted attack prob-
lem. In this case, an adversary tries to compute an adver-
sarial perturbation v to change the label towards a specific
target class t, i.e., fθ(x0 + v) = t. The norm of v should
be small enough. The only information available from the
classification system is the top-1 label and the number of
queries is assumed to be limited.
Similarly to the non-targeted attack, we need a starting
point in the target adversarial class, close to the decision
boundary. But it is almost impossible to change the label
of the original image to a specific target label by adding
random noise. We therefore utilize an arbitrary image xt
belonging to the target class t to find a proper starting point
P .
As the distance between x0 and xt can be quite large,
the decision boundary between original and target adversar-
ial region cannot be treated as flat. We cannot find a good
estimation around P as we did in the non-targeted attack
case. In the targeted attack, we therefore use a new way to
compute and update the starting point Pi in each iteration,
as shown in Fig. 2. We first perform a linear interpolation
in the direction of (xt − x0) to find a starting point P0,
P0 := min
α
(x0 + α · xt − x0||xt − x0||2 ) s.t. fθ(P0) = t (5)
The gradient direction ξ0 at P0 can be estimated with
the same method as for non-targeted attacks. We then get
a point Q0, which is slightly away from the boundary, by
adding a small perturbation at P0 in this direction, i.e.,
Q0 = P0 + δ · ξ0. In the direction of (Q0 − x0), P1 can
be searched with the method in Eq. (5). Motivated by Qi
(i = 0, 1, ...,m), another point Pi+1 near the boundary can
be found quickly. Points Pi can walk along the boundary
until the computed adversarial perturbation converges, i.e.,
(Pm − x0) ‖ ∇f(Pm), and finally Pm is the adversarial
Algorithm 2: Targeted qFool
Input: original image x0, target image xt, initial
estimation number nu, a threshold .
1 i = 0 ;
2 Compute direction ν0 = xt−x0||xt−x0||2 ;
3 Search starting point P0 in direction νi by Eq. (5) ;
4 while
∑i
j=0 n
(j) < n do
5 n(i) = 0 ;
6 x
(i)
adv = x
′
adv = Pi ;
7 while
∥∥∥x(i)adv−Pi∥∥∥
n(i)+nu
≤  · ‖x
′
adv−Pi‖
n(i)
and∑i
j=0 n
(j) < n do
8 Make nu new queries ;
9 x′adv = x
(i)
adv ;
10 n(i) = n(i) + nu ;
11 Estimate gradient ξi at Pi with n(i) queries
in full/sub space;
12 Qi = Pi + δ · ξi ;
13 νi =
Qi−x0
||Qi−x0||2 ;
14 Search x(i)adv in the direction νi by Eq. (5) ;
15 end
16 Pi+1 = x(i)adv , i = i+ 1 ;
17 end
18 return x(i−1)adv
example we get. Alg. 2 describes the algorithm in details.
We note that the targeted qFool attack algorithm can also
be executed in either the full data space or limited to a pre-
defined subspace.
5. Experimental Results
We evaluate qFool using 250 images randomly chosen
from the validation set of ImageNet on the networks VGG-
19 [24], ResNet-50 [10] and Inception-v3 [25]. We measure
the median of the average norm of all adversarial perturba-
tions after a specific number of queries, defined by
MX (n) = median
xi∈X
(
1
m
‖v(xi, n)‖22
)
, (6)
where v(xi, n) ∈ Rm is an adversarial perturbation gen-
erated for sample xi using n queries to the model. The
median is taken over the images in dataset X .
5.1. Non-targeted attacks
For the non-targeted attack, Fig. 3 shows samples of ad-
versarial perturbations on different models. We compare
qFool with Boundary attack [3] on ImageNet. The results
can be seen in Fig. 4. When the distances between adversar-
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Figure 3: Original images and adversarial perturbations by qFool in the full space and subspace on different models for
a “frog” and a “vase” (20,000 queries). The resulting perturbed images are classified as “snake” (first row) and “goblet”
(second row). In addition, qFool in the subspace can get smaller perturbation than full space for the same number of queries.
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Figure 4: Distance (the median of MSE in Eq. (6)) between adversarial example and original image over numbers of queries
in non-targeted qFool and Boundary attack [3] against different models.
ial examples generated by the two methods and original im-
ages are similar, qFool always spends fewer queries. qFool
can converge much faster: if the number of queries is lim-
ited to a small value (e.g., 10000), our method can achieve
much better performance.
In addition, compared with qFool in full space, the sub-
space version can reduce the number of queries even more.
Specifically, in this work, we use a 2-dimensional Dis-
crete Cosine Transform (DCT) basis to define the low-
dimensional subspace. Let S = {ψi,j}i,j=0,...,√m−1 be
the basis in the subspace of dimension m. When estimating
gradients in the subspace, we use n noise vectors η∗i = Sγi,
where γi ∼ N (0, Im), instead of vectors ηi ∼ N (0, Id).
In our experiments, the dimension d of full space is
224×224 or 299×299, we use 250 images in the ImageNet
training set to find the best subspace. From Fig. 5, the best
dimensions m of subspace range from 70 × 70 to 90 × 90.
We choose
√
m = 75, i.e., we use a low frequency subspace
S of dimension m = 75× 75. The method of using pertur-
bation vectors in the subspace to estimate the gradient of
boundary can achieve higher efficiency, as shown in Fig. 4.
We also compare qFool with several white-box methods
on 50 images when applying no more than 10,000 queries,
shown in Table. 1. FGSM and DeepFool are gradient-
based attacks, that unsurprisingly need fewer predictions
(queries). C&W, a gradient-based attack as well, achieves
the smallest perturbation with more queries. As decision-
based attacks, qFool can get much smaller perturbation than
Boundary attack. Besides, qFool has an obvious advantage
in the number of iterations, that can bring significant speed-
ups because of its high parallelization.
In addition, we observe in our experiments that, for
250 different images, the number of iterations is no more
than 4, and the allocation of n queries in consecutive it-
erations computed by our algorithm conforms to a similar
rule: in the first few iterations, the numbers of queries are
small, while the last iteration needs a much larger number
of queries, shown in Fig. 6. It indicates that the basic logic
6
Table 1: Comparison with different non-targeted attacks on the total number of backward gra-
dient computation (#gradients), the total number of forward predictions (#predictions) and the
total number of iterations (#iterations). (FGSM∗ is a modified version of FGSM that tries to
find the smallest perturbation in the direction of the sign of the gradient.)
#gradients #predictions #iterations MSE
VGG-19 ResNet-50 Inception-v3
FGSM∗ 1 ∼69 ∼69 1.28e-6 6.37e-7 1.20e-5
DeepFool ∼20 ∼20 ∼ 2 2.76e-7 1.71e-7 6.12e-7
C&W 10000 10000 10000 2.22e-7 2.26e-7 3.25e-7
Boundary attack 0 ∼10000 ∼500 4.61e-4 1.15e-3 1.79e-3
qFool-fullspace 0 ∼ 10000 ∼3 1.16e-5 1.03e-4 2.48e-4
qFool-subspace 0 ∼ 10000 ∼3 6.15e-6 4.14e-5 1.80e-4
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Figure 5: `2-distance between adversarial examples and
original images in ImageNet training set over different
subspace dimensions in non-targeted qFool attacks against
three classifier models. (Results for VGG-19 are multiplied
by 10 to make the dynamic range roughly the same.)
of qFool algorithm is reasonable and effective. Allocating
some small numbers of queries to the first several iterations
can make the starting point closer to the theoretical adver-
sarial example, which leads to a more locally flat boundary
at the starting point, and thus a more accurate approxima-
tion of adversarial perturbation direction.
5.2. Targeted attacks
In targeted attacks, we use 250 samples in ImageNet. For
each of them, we draw a target label randomly and pick one
target image belonging to the target label randomly. We
keep this original-target image pair consistent in all exper-
iments of targeted attacks. The results are shown in Fig. 8.
We can see that, when the number of queries is not so large,
our algorithm is more efficient than the Boundary attack
method [3]. Although the two curves cross at 100, 000
queries, qFool converges much faster. In the first several
thousand queries, qFool can find a much smaller adversar-
ial perturbation than Boundary attack. Therefore, in set-
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Figure 6: Distribution of 10,000 queries in different itera-
tions for 250 images. We have grouped the images accord-
ing to the number of used iterations. More than 30% images
only need 2 iterations, and most queries appear in their sec-
ond iteration. Other images need three or four iterations,
and the last iteration similarly contain the most queries.
tings where the number of queries is limited, our algorithm
is more efficient. Some samples are shown in Fig. 9.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 7: Attacking Google Cloud Vision. (a) original: ‘dog
like mammal’ (b) adversarial: ‘hair’ (1500 queries) (c) orig-
inal: ‘flag’ (d) adversarial: ‘sky’ (500 queries)
Different target labels or target images obviously result
in different numbers of queries, as shown in Table 2. We
list results at around 100,000 queries. It shows that MSE
of adversarial examples is not positively correlated with the
distance between the original and target image. Two images
that are close in the spatial domain may not be similar in the
feature domain.
5.3. Attacks on commercial classifiers
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of qFool, we
apply our non-targeted attack algorithm to one sample com-
mercial system, namely Google Cloud Vision Image Recog-
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Figure 8: Distance between adversarial example and original image versus numbers of queries in targeted qFool and Boundary
attack [3] in three different network models.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Figure 9: qFool in targeted attacks on VGG-19. (a) original:‘cardoon’ (b) target:‘vase’ (c) adversarial perturbation in full
space (d) adversarial example in full space (e) adversarial perturbation in subspace (f) adversarial example in subspace. We
use 50,000 queries in this experiment. The MSE is 4.40e-4 in full space and 1.12e-4 in subspace.
0.155
99938
8.91e-4
0.126
99973
7.06e-4
“school bus” “French loaf” “sunflower”“golden retriever”
original distance
#query
adversarial distance
target classoriginal class
0.159 0.1820.180 0.1920.122 0.211 0.200
99993 9944399127 9999899514 99135 99928
5.27e-4 5.79e-47.90e-4 7.07e-43.09e-4 3.08e-4 3.60e-4
13 10 8 632 23 4
modify
Table 2: Targeted qFool attacks on different target labels and target images. Our goal is to fool the “school bus” to 
be classified as three different classes: “French loaf”, “golden retriever” and “sunflower”. For each class, we 
select three different images randomly. Original distance is the     distance between the original image and target 
image. Adversarial distance is the     distance between the original image and the generated adversarial example 
after approximately 100,000 queries by targeted qFool attack.
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<latexit sha1_base64="/woxTzFZt4EnoavoXRgwNrjMOco=">AAAB/XicbVA9SwNBEJ3zM8avqKXNYRCswl0QtAzaWE YwH5AcYW8zl6zZ3Tt294RwBP+CrfZ2YutvsfWXuEmuMIkPBh7vzTAzL0w408bzvp219Y3Nre3CTnF3b//gsHR03NRxqig2aMxj1Q6JRs4kNgwzHNuJQiJCjq1wdDv1W0+oNIvlgxknGAgykCxilBgrNbvIea/aK5W9ijeDu0r8nJQhR71X+un2Y5oK lIZyonXH9xITZEQZRjlOit1UY0LoiAywY6kkAnWQza6duOdW6btRrGxJ487UvxMZEVqPRWg7BTFDvexNxf+8Tmqi6yBjMkkNSjpfFKXcNbE7fd3tM4XU8LElhCpmb3XpkChCjQ1oYUsoJkUbir8cwSppViu+V/HvL8u1mzyeApzCGVyAD1dQgzuoQw MoPMILvMKb8+y8Ox/O57x1zclnTmABztcvgFyVhg==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="/woxTzFZt4EnoavoXRgwNrjMOco=">AAAB/XicbVA9SwNBEJ3zM8avqKXNYRCswl0QtAzaWE YwH5AcYW8zl6zZ3Tt294RwBP+CrfZ2YutvsfWXuEmuMIkPBh7vzTAzL0w408bzvp219Y3Nre3CTnF3b//gsHR03NRxqig2aMxj1Q6JRs4kNgwzHNuJQiJCjq1wdDv1W0+oNIvlgxknGAgykCxilBgrNbvIea/aK5W9ijeDu0r8nJQhR71X+un2Y5oK lIZyonXH9xITZEQZRjlOit1UY0LoiAywY6kkAnWQza6duOdW6btRrGxJ487UvxMZEVqPRWg7BTFDvexNxf+8Tmqi6yBjMkkNSjpfFKXcNbE7fd3tM4XU8LElhCpmb3XpkChCjQ1oYUsoJkUbir8cwSppViu+V/HvL8u1mzyeApzCGVyAD1dQgzuoQw MoPMILvMKb8+y8Ox/O57x1zclnTmABztcvgFyVhg==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="/woxTzFZt4EnoavoXRgwNrjMOco=">AAAB/XicbVA9SwNBEJ3zM8avqKXNYRCswl0QtAzaWE YwH5AcYW8zl6zZ3Tt294RwBP+CrfZ2YutvsfWXuEmuMIkPBh7vzTAzL0w408bzvp219Y3Nre3CTnF3b//gsHR03NRxqig2aMxj1Q6JRs4kNgwzHNuJQiJCjq1wdDv1W0+oNIvlgxknGAgykCxilBgrNbvIea/aK5W9ijeDu0r8nJQhR71X+un2Y5oK lIZyonXH9xITZEQZRjlOit1UY0LoiAywY6kkAnWQza6duOdW6btRrGxJ487UvxMZEVqPRWg7BTFDvexNxf+8Tmqi6yBjMkkNSjpfFKXcNbE7fd3tM4XU8LElhCpmb3XpkChCjQ1oYUsoJkUbir8cwSppViu+V/HvL8u1mzyeApzCGVyAD1dQgzuoQw MoPMILvMKb8+y8Ox/O57x1zclnTmABztcvgFyVhg==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="/woxTzFZt4EnoavoXRgwNrjMOco=">AAAB/XicbVA9SwNBEJ3zM8avqKXNYRCswl0QtAzaWE YwH5AcYW8zl6zZ3Tt294RwBP+CrfZ2YutvsfWXuEmuMIkPBh7vzTAzL0w408bzvp219Y3Nre3CTnF3b//gsHR03NRxqig2aMxj1Q6JRs4kNgwzHNuJQiJCjq1wdDv1W0+oNIvlgxknGAgykCxilBgrNbvIea/aK5W9ijeDu0r8nJQhR71X+un2Y5oK lIZyonXH9xITZEQZRjlOit1UY0LoiAywY6kkAnWQza6duOdW6btRrGxJ487UvxMZEVqPRWg7BTFDvexNxf+8Tmqi6yBjMkkNSjpfFKXcNbE7fd3tM4XU8LElhCpmb3XpkChCjQ1oYUsoJkUbir8cwSppViu+V/HvL8u1mzyeApzCGVyAD1dQgzuoQw MoPMILvMKb8+y8Ox/O57x1zclnTmABztcvgFyVhg==</latexit>
nition service, where users can get some tags associated
with the input image and the corresponding confidence
scores after querying the model. But we only use the final
decision (top-1 tag) in order to attack this classifier.
Adversaries would ideally want to use the smallest num-
ber of queries to get an adversarial example with a relatively
good visual quality. Since qFool performs particularly well
when the number of queries is not very large, it is suitable
for attacking commercial classifiers. Fig. 7 demonstrates
some adversarial examples generated by only 500 ∼ 1500
queries. In the first ‘dog’ image, the MSE is 7.53e-5, which
is totally imperceptible by human eyes. We only use 1500
queries to the model. Its new top-1 label is ‘hair’, and it
indicates that the generated perturbation might mislead the
model to ignore the whole content of this image yet focus
on some local information. In the second ‘flag’ image, we
use only 500 queries and the MSE achieves 2.66e-6. The
perturbation makes the model ignore the existence of the
object flag, and classify the image as ‘sky’.
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6. Conclusion
In this work, we propose a novel query-efficient
decision-based attack algorithm, namely qFool, for settings
where the attacker only has access to the final decision (top-
1 label) of a model. Our algorithm is based on the obser-
vation that the curvature of the boundary is small around
adversarial examples. We use a simple way to estimate
the gradient direction of the boundary, and construct imper-
ceptible adversarial examples using the estimated direction.
With this method, the required number of queries in both
our non-targeted and targeted attacks can be reduced drasti-
cally compared to previous decision-based attacks. We also
enhance qFool by constraining the gradient estimation to a
pre-defined subspace, which further reduces the number of
queries. We finally apply qFool on Google Cloud Vision,
demonstrating the effectiveness of our attack on a sample
real-world black-box classifier.
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